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Introduction 
In the 2005 case United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court transformed the 
nature of federal sentencing by declaring the application of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines unconstitutional and as a remedy, making the once mandatory guidelines 
merely advisory. Prior to Booker, sentencing judges were bound to sentence within a 
given range based on a calculation involving the offense and the defendant’s criminal 
history. Departures were rare and required additional factfinding by judges. These 
circumstances generally referred to if the defendant had “special offender characteristics” 
such as age, physical condition, or mental condition. Though somewhat broad, these 
characteristics were generally only considered in unusual cases.
1
 Booker was based on 
the principle that any fact necessary to impose a sentence must be found by a jury, not a 
judge. Under mandatory guidelines, imposing an above guideline sentence required 
judicial factfinding, which would violate the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.  
Five justices subscribed to this view, holding judicial factfinding under mandatory 
Guidelines to violate the Sixth Amendment. But the Court was still left with various 
remedial options to make the Guidelines compliant with the Sixth Amendment. They 
could, for example, retain mandatory guidelines but require jury determination of facts 
necessary to impose an above guideline sentence. A distinct set of five justices
2
, however, 
took a different route: making the Guidelines advisory instead of mandatory and 
maintaining judicial factfinding. By making the Guidelines advisory, the Court created a 
system where judicial factfinding was not necessary to impose an above guideline 
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sentence and therefore consistent with the Sixth Amendment. The Court noted the 
Guidelines, though not legally binding, were still important. To ensure that sentences 
were not handed out arbitrarily, the Court mandated appellate review of sentences for 
reasonableness. The court did not explicate much regarding what would make a sentence 
reasonable. How appellate courts conducted reasonableness review would have a 
significant impact on the weight advisory guidelines would carry.
3
  
Booker had significant implications for criminal defendants. Judges once bound 
by the structured Guidelines were now free, formally at least, to sentence at their own 
discretion. They were subject only to appellate review for reasonableness, which was a 
fairly vague standard. The Court did stress that the Guidelines still carried weight. But 
just how much and the particularities of reasonableness review were left largely to the 
lower courts to sort out.  
The behavior of these lower court judges is then of significance. The Supreme 
Court interestingly defied the prevailing ideological explanation of judicial behavior in 
Booker. The more conservative Justice Scalia stood united with the more liberal Justice 
Stevens in forcefully advocating the unconstitutionality of mandatory guidelines and 
opposing the remedy of advisory guidelines. On the other side, ideological opposites 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Breyer joined to defend the constitutionality of the 
Guidelines and to push for advisory guidelines as a remedy. The behavior of the Court 
was inconsistent with the dominant attitudinal model of judicial behavior, which holds 
ideology to be the driving factor in Supreme Court decision making.
4
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But while the breakdown of ideology was starkly apparent in the Supreme Court, 
the question remained as to whether this was also the case in the lower courts. Indeed, 
while much attention has been placed on Supreme Court justices, the behavior of lower 
court judges is perhaps the more crucial issue, especially for criminal defendants. After 
all, the circuit level is as high as the vast majority of cases ever reach. This thesis strives 
to provide insight into the behavior of these judges by looking at their behavior on issues 
relating to Booker and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. It looks not only at ideology, 
but also other potential explanations such as legalist and pragmatist principles, judicial 
workload, and district court experience. 
This thesis fits into the larger framework of explaining judicial behavior and more 
specifically, the behavior of appellate court judges. Research in this area has taken many 
tracks, the most dominant of which is the attitudinal model. The attitudinal model 
suggests that ideology, whether a judge is liberal or conservative, is the driving factor in 
judicial decision making. Indeed, there is a good bit of literature that supports this 
notion.
5
 Despite the strength of ideology in explaining judicial behavior, there has also 
been much work on what role the law plays in decision making. For the lower courts this 
has largely focused on the effects of precedent.
6
 More comprehensive legal theories such 
as originalism have also been looked at.
7
 Scholars have also used economic theory to 
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explain judicial behavior.
8
 In this framework, the judge is treated as a “rational, self-
interested utility maximizer,” where utility is comprised of factors such as income, 
leisure, power, prestige, reputation, and intrinsic pleasure.
9
  
This thesis looks at appellate court decision making in relation to the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines from all these perspectives. It tests the explanatory power of 
ideology on judicial decision making. It also looks at legal factors. Given the 
transformative effect of Booker and the broad discretion the Supreme Court afforded to 
appellate judges, precedent would likely not be much of a constraint. Instead, this thesis 
looks at the difference between legalists or formalists, who focus more on the law, and 
pragmatists, who focus more on consequences.
10
 It does this by looking at ideological 
extremism. Granted, ideological extremism is not a perfect proxy; however, it still 
provides some tangible means of quantitatively examining the issue. Economically, this 
thesis focuses on the leisure aspect of judicial utility through the examination of the 
relationship between judicial workload and behavior. It may be the case that judges 
choose certain doctrines based on their tendency to reduce future workload. In addition to 
these angles, this thesis looks at whether having district court experience has any effect 
on decision making in this area. District court judges are responsible for actually 
sentencing defendants, so it may be that having this experience may drive judges to act in 
a certain way. The Guidelines are a particularly interesting area to examine judicial 
behavior. They raise fundamental legal questions, demanding policy judgments, and real 
concerns over the efficiency of the courts. 
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Issues 
 The lack of direct guidance to lower courts in Booker created a multitude of issues 
for the appellate courts to sort out. Though many of these issues were precise and 
technical, larger issues emerged across the circuits that were viable for meaningful 
analysis. This thesis looks at the following issues: the constitutionality of the Guidelines, 
what to do about appeals that were still pending when Booker was decided, whether 
judges could adopt a presumption of reasonableness for within guideline sentences, and 
whether judges could deviate from the set crack-cocaine ratio set by the Guidelines. All 
of these issues were addressed broadly by many circuits and resulted in significant circuit 
splits. In addition to the constitutionality of the Guidelines, the presumption of 
reasonableness issue and the crack-cocaine issue created enough conflict to ultimately 
warrant Supreme Court review.
11
  The issue of how to deal with pending appeals also 
resulted in a deep circuit split, but the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Sentencing expert 
Douglas Berman suggested the issue was worthy of Supreme Court review but that by the 
time the Court ruled, the number of applicable cases would be so small as to make a 
decision ineffectual.
12
 Nevertheless, these issues were all central as to how a post-Booker 
sentencing world would operate and created significant conflict between the circuits.  
 
Constitutionality of the Guidelines 
 Booker was preceded by a line of cases that made its outcome not wholly 
unexpected. The Supreme Court first transformed the sentencing landscape in the 2000 
case Apprendi v. New Jersey by establishing the principle that any fact that increases a 
                                                 
11
 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. ___ (2007). 
12
 Douglas A. Berman, “Pondering the SCOTUS plain error dodge,” Sentencing Law and Policy, June 20, 
2005, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_
 6
sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be found by a jury, beyond a reasonable 
doubt.
13
 In the 2004 case Blakely v. Washington, the Supreme Court applied this 
reasoning to the state of Washington’s sentencing guidelines. The relevant statutory 
maximum was the top of the guideline range. Thus, any fact necessary to impose an 
above guideline sentence had to be found by a jury, not a judge.
14
  
The structure of the Washington scheme was very similar to the federal scheme 
leading to the expectation that the Court would extend Blakely to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines. Indeed, in dissent, Justice Breyer hinted at the fate of the Guidelines in 
saying, “Perhaps the Court will distinguish the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but I am 
uncertain how.”
15
  Thus, following Blakely, the lower courts had the opportunity to 
address whether the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were constitutional. Although there 
seemed to be a good deal of expectation that the Guidelines were unconstitutional, the 
majority of circuits that addressed the issue found them constitutional. 
Table 1. Positions on the Constitutionality of the Guidelines 
Circuit Case Outcome 
2
nd
 United States v. Mincey Constitutional 
4
th
 United States v. Hammoud Constitutional 
5
th
 United States v. Pineiro Constitutional 
6
th
 United States v. Koch Constitutional 
7
th
 United States v. Booker Unconstitutional  
8
th
 United States v. Mooney Unconstitutional 
9
th
 United States v. Ameline Unconstitutional 
11
th
 United States v. Reese Constitutional 
 
 For the courts that struck down the Guidelines, these cases presented a 
straightforward application of Blakely. In the 7
th
 Circuit Booker case that eventually 
reached the Supreme Court, Judge Richard Posner wrote, “Blakely dooms the guidelines 
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insofar as they require that sentences be based on facts found by a judge.”
16
 Imposing an 
above guideline sentence required additional facts, which if found by a judge, violated 
the Sixth Amendment. The 7
th
 Circuit left sentencing judges with the option of imposing 
a within guideline sentence or submitting the facts necessary for an above guideline 
sentence to a sentencing jury. The court declined to rule on the severability of the 
guidelines. If the requirement that judges find sentencing facts was not severable from the 
rest of the substantive portions of the Guidelines, the Guidelines as a whole would fall.
17
 
The other circuits that held this view ruled in a similar manner. The 9
th
 Circuit in Ameline 
for example, held the top of the guideline range to be the relevant statutory maximum, 
but declined to rule the Guidelines as a whole facially invalid.
18
 
 The courts upholding the Guidelines rested their cases on grounds both procedural 
and substantive. Judge Frank Easterbrook expressed the procedural objections to ruling 
the Guidelines unconstitutional in his dissent in Booker. He noted that existing case law 
allowed judicial factfinding in relation to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines so long as 
the sentence was within the overall statutory maximum, not the narrower Blakely view.
19
 
Even if Blakely completely undermined this decision, it did not mean a lower court was 
“entitled to put it in a coffin while it is still breathing.”
20
 Only the Supreme Court could 
overrule one of its own decisions.  
The substantive reasons for upholding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were 
based primarily on distinguishing them structurally from those at issue in Blakely. 
Writing for the 6
th
 Circuit in United States v. Koch, Judge Jeffrey Sutton argued that 
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unlike Blakely, these guidelines were not statutes. Instead, they were “agency-
promulgated rules enacted by the Sentencing Commission—a non-elected body that finds 
its home within the Judicial Branch, the very branch of government in which sentencing 
discretion has traditionally been vested.”
21
 This distinction was at least enough not to 
require applying Blakely to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Given the drastic effects 
of striking down the Guidelines, it was better to err on the side of the caution. Legal 
arguments aside, this fear of dramatically altering the sentencing landscape was a central 
concern of judges. Easterbrook warned, “Today’s decision will discombobulate the whole 
criminal-law docket. I trust that our superiors will have something to say about this 
soon.”
22
 
 
Plain Error 
 Of course, Judge Easterbrook’s superiors did have something to say. A pressing 
concern once Booker was decided was how to deal cases that were still pending. Booker 
would apply to these cases, but as Justice Breyer suggested in his remedial opinion, “That 
fact does not mean that we believe that every sentence gives rise to a Sixth Amendment 
violation. Nor do we believe that every appeal will lead to a new sentencing hearing… 
we expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, for 
example, whether the issue was raised below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.”
23
 
If the issue was not raised in the lower courts, appellate courts had only the discretion to 
correct plain errors.  
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To make this determination, the Court set out a four pronged test in United States 
v. Olano: there had to be an error, the error had to be plain or clear, it had to affect 
substantial rights, and the error had to affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings. To affect substantial rights, the error had to be prejudicial, meaning 
the defendant had to show his sentence would have been different if not for the error. The 
Supreme Court also left open the possibility that courts of appeals could deem some 
errors presumptively prejudiced.
24
 It is important to note that there were two possible 
errors. The first was constitutional error, which occurred if a defendant’s sentence was 
increased above the relevant guideline based on facts not found by a jury. The second 
was statutory error, which was that a sentence was imposed under mandatory, instead of 
advisory guidelines. Statutory error was present in every case, whereas constitutional 
error was only present in a small number of cases. Most courts did not distinguish 
between the two for the purposes of plain error analysis except for the courts that adopted 
a presumption of prejudice. All courts agreed that there was an error and that it was clear. 
They diverged, however, primarily on the whether the error affected substantial rights. 
  The simplest application of Olano was to require a defendant to show a 
reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different if not for the error. 
This approach was adopted by the 1
st
, 5
th
, 8
th
, 10
th
, and 11
th
 circuits. The 11
th
 Circuit in 
United States v. Rodriguez noted that fulfilling the third prong was meant to be tough so 
as to “encourage timely objections and reduce wasteful reversals.”
25
 Accordingly, the 
burden was squarely on the defendant to show he would have received a different 
sentence under advisory guidelines. Admittedly, this would be very difficult to show and 
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in most cases the court simply could not know if the sentence would have been different. 
But given the toughness of plain error review, “If the effect of the error is uncertain so 
that we do not know which, if either, side it helped the defendant loses.”
26
 Other circuits 
criticized the harshness of this approach. Writing for the 7
th
 Circuit, Judge Posner 
wondered, “Why the Eleventh Circuit wants to condemn some unknown fraction of 
criminal defendants to serve an illegal sentence.”
27
 
Table 2. Positions on Plain Error 
Circuit Case Outcome 
1
st  
1
st
  
United States v. Antonakopoulos  
United States v. Serrano-Beauvaix  
Reasonable Probability  
Reasonable Probability 
2
nd
 United States v. Crosby  Limited Remand 
3
rd
 United States v. Davis Presumption of Prejudice 
4
th
 United States v. Hughes Presumption of Prejudice 
5
th
 United States v. Mares  Reasonable Probability 
6
th 
6
th
  
United States v. Barnett 
United States v. Oliver 
Presumption of Prejudice 
Presumption of Prejudice 
7
th
 United States v. Paladino  Limited Remand 
8
th
 United States v. Pirani Reasonable Probability 
9
th
 United States v. Ameline Limited Remand 
10
th
 United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta Reasonable Probability 
11
th 
11
th
  
United States v. Rodriguez 
United States v. Thompson  
Reasonable Probability 
Reasonable Probability 
D.C. United States v. Coles Limited Remand 
 
 The 3
rd
, 4
th
, and 6
th
 circuits adopted an approach more lenient to defendants by 
utilizing the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Olano that presuming prejudice was 
appropriate in certain instances. These courts also distinguished between constitutional 
and statutory error. If there was a constitutional error, the third prong was always met.
28
 
If there was only statutory error, the courts adopted a rebuttable presumption of 
prejudice. In United States v. Barnett, the 6
th
 Circuit noted courts have used this approach 
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when “the inherent nature of the error made it exceptionally difficult for the defendant to 
demonstrate that the outcome of the lower court would have been different had the error 
not occurred.”
29
 According to these circuits, the Booker remedy fundamentally 
transformed the structure of federal sentencing in a way that made it extraordinarily 
difficult for defendants to show their sentence would have been different. To show this a 
defendant “would presumably have to demonstrate that the district court somehow 
intimated that it felt constrained by the Guidelines or that it would have preferred to 
sentence the defendant to a lower sentence.”
30
 Given the long-standing and mandatory 
nature of the Guidelines and the mechanisms of appellate review that sought to ensure 
within guideline sentences, it was unrealistic for district courts to do this and presuming 
prejudice was appropriate. It is important to note that this presumption was rebuttable, 
but the burden was on the government, a fundamental shift from the other circuits that 
placed it on the defendant.  
Other circuits criticized this approach for remanding every case with a 
constitutional error and just about every case with a statutory error. The presumption 
approach “overlooked… if the judge would have imposed the same sentence even if he 
thought the guidelines merely advisory…”
31
 Clearly, there was no prejudice in this 
potentially real hypothetical, yet the sentence would be remanded anyway.  
 There was clearly uncertainty over whether sentencing would have been different 
under advisory guidelines. The circuits that adopted the reasonable probability approach 
inherently favored the government, while those that presumed prejudice inherently 
favored defendants. Other circuits, however, took a more novel approach: to get rid of the 
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uncertainty once and for all. This was the approach of the 2
nd
, 7
th
, 9
th
, and D.C. circuits 
and relied on issuing a limited remand to the district court. The appellate court would 
retain jurisdiction of the appeal, but issue a remand only for the purpose of allowing the 
district judge to say whether or not he would issue the same sentence under advisory 
guidelines. If he would, the circuit court would affirm the sentence so long as it was 
reasonable. If he would not, the circuit court would vacate the sentence and remand for 
resentencing.
32
 This was the most nonstandard approach and courts justified it on both 
practical and legal terms. The 7
th
 Circuit claimed this was “the only practical way (and as 
it happens also to be the shortest, the easiest, the quickest, and the surest way),” to 
determine whether a sentence would be different if not for the error.
33
 Legally, the 2
nd
 
Circuit argued that appellate courts had the statutory power to “remand… for further 
sentencing proceedings…” sentences imposed in violation of the law.
34
 It concluded that 
the limited remand fell into “further sentencing proceedings.” If an appellate court has the 
power to remand a case fulfilling plain error analysis, it “necessarily has the lesser power 
to remand for a determination of whether to resentence…”
35
  
Other circuits did not find this justification persuasive. The 11
th
 Circuit argued 
that plain error review was only to be based on the record before appellate courts. 
Furthermore, the limited remand practically amounted to requiring resentencing for all 
cases, as on the limited remand, lawyers were allowed to reargue the sentence. 
Essentially this was “a mock-resentencing” that also added “the real possibility of another 
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appeal and another remand on top of that.”
36
 According to the 11
th
 Circuit, this was not 
consistent with the purpose of plain error analysis, which was to dissuade unnecessary 
reversals.  
 This resulted in a deep, three-way split among the circuits. The division was not 
resolved by the Supreme Court despite the Solicitor General seeking writs of certiorari in 
both Barnett and Rodriguez. The division had a legitimate impact on defendants. Those 
that faced a reasonable probability standard had a very small chance of resentencing, 
while those that faced a presumption of prejudice could almost be certain of it. 
Nevertheless, since the number of cases implicating this issue was fixed, as time went by 
the issue waned.  
 
Presumption of Reasonableness 
The courts then started to deal with the particularities of reasonableness review. 
Courts were to review sentences for reasonableness based on several statutory factors. 
Among many others, these included the nature of the offense, criminal history, the need 
for the sentence to provide deterrence, and the need for the sentence to promote respect 
for the law.
 37
 Underlying the issues of reasonableness review was the fundamental 
question of how much influence advisory guidelines were to have.  
A key manifestation of this question was the issue of whether appellate courts 
could adopt a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness for within guideline sentences. 
On the one hand, the Guidelines represented years of research and fine-tuning by the 
United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) and accordingly could be expected to be 
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reasonable in many normal cases. But a presumption of reasonableness could provide an 
incentive for judges to overwhelmingly hand out within guideline sentences as they 
would very likely be affirmed. Advisory guidelines might be advisory in name only, and 
would essentially function as mandatory guidelines, seemingly reintroducing the Sixth 
Amendment problem. 
 The vast majority of circuits found there to be a rebuttable presumption of 
reasonableness for within guideline sentences. As the 7
th
 Circuit noted, the Guidelines 
still were a key component in sentencing, and adopting a presumption of reasonableness 
was “the best way to express the new balance…”
38
 An important reason for the 
presumption, as the 4
th
 Circuit argued, was the “legislative and administrative process by 
which they were created.”
39
 Congress gave the task of formulating sentencing guidelines 
to the USSC, who put an immense amount of research and analysis into developing them. 
More importantly, that research and analysis is ongoing and the Guidelines are subject to 
review and revision, allowing them to adapt to changes in the sentencing landscape. 
There was then good reason to believe that they are generally representative of what a 
reasonable sentence ought to be.  
Additionally, many of the statutory factors the courts were to consider were built 
into the Guidelines. The nature of the offense and criminal history were integral parts of 
the Guidelines and Congress charged the USSC to take into account all of the statutory 
factors when drafting the Guidelines. There was then good reason to expect a within 
guideline sentence to be consistent with the statutory factors courts were to focus on in 
reasonableness review.  
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39
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Finally, even though the Guidelines were somewhat mechanical, they still relied 
on extensive, individualized determination of facts and sentences that allowed for some 
flexibility. This would decrease the likelihood that unusual cases that warranted variance 
would be unfairly subject to the Guidelines anyway.
40
 It was necessary for this 
presumption to be rebuttable. To hold within guideline sentences as inherently 
reasonable, as the government originally argued, would “undo the Supreme Court’s 
merits analysis in Booker.”
41
 Still, the 7
th
 Circuit speculated that it would be very “rare” 
for a within guideline sentence to be unreasonable, suggesting very few defendants would 
actually be able to rebut the presumption.
42
 
Table 3. Positions on Presumption of Reasonableness 
Circuit Case Outcome 
1
st
 United States v. Jimenez-Beltre No Presumption 
2
nd
 United States v. Fernandez No Presumption 
3
rd
 United States v. Cooper No Presumption 
4
th 
4
th
  
United States v. Green 
United States v. Johnson  
Presumption 
Presumption 
5
th 
5
th
  
United States v. Alonzo  
United States v. Smith 
Presumption 
Presumption 
6
th 
6
th
  
United States v. Foreman 
United States v. Williams 
Presumption 
Presumption 
7
th
 United States v. Mykytiuk Presumption 
8
th
 United States v. Lincoln Presumption 
10
th
 United States v. Kristl Presumption 
11
th
 United States v. Talley No Presumption 
D.C. United States v. Dorcely Presumption 
 
 The courts that did not adopt a presumption of reasonableness based their 
decisions on the premise that being within the guidelines was not necessarily sufficient to 
satisfy reasonableness review. As the 3
rd
 Circuit argued, “Although a within-guidelines 
sentence demonstrates the court considered one of the § 3553(a) factors – namely, the 
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guidelines range itself… it does not show the court considered the other standards 
reflected in that section…”
43
 These courts advocated a more robust interpretation of 
reasonableness review. As the 2
nd
 Circuit noted, “We examine the record as a whole to 
determine whether a sentence is reasonable in a specific case.”
44
 These courts ruled that 
the Guidelines alone did not encompass enough of the relevant statutory factors. 
Accordingly, it was inappropriate to adopt such a presumption. Still, these circuits 
admitted “a within-guidelines range sentence is more likely to be reasonable than one that 
lies outside the advisory guidelines range,” and that the burden was still on the defendant 
to show his sentence to be unreasonable.
45
 Nevertheless, the implications of a 
presumption were troubling. As the 1
st
 Circuit pointed out, “Although making the 
guidelines ‘presumptive’… does not make them mandatory, it tends in that direction…”
46
 
 Ultimately, the Supreme Court took up the issue in Rita v. United States. Using 
similar reasoning as the circuit courts that adopted a presumption of reasonableness, the 
Court held that appellate courts were allowed to do this. It did not, however, mandate 
such a presumption, meaning the circuit split would continue. 
47
  
 
Crack-Cocaine 
The Supreme Court resolved the presumption of reasonableness issue, but lower 
courts still had contentious issues in which to work out the role of the guidelines in a 
post-Booker world. One of these issues focused on one of the more controversial specific 
guidelines, the one that required 100 times more powder-cocaine than crack-cocaine to 
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 United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3
rd
 Cir. 2006). 
44
 United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 28 (2
nd
 Cir. 2006). 
45
 Cooper, 437 F.3d at 331. 
46
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47
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give a drug trafficker the same sentence. This particular guideline had come under 
persistent criticism from the USSC itself since 1995 for creating unwarranted distortions 
and disparities.
48
 Despite this criticism, Congress rejected several proposed changes to 
the guideline. Under mandatory guidelines, judges were undoubtedly bound to the 100-
to-1 ratio. But the advent of advisory guidelines gave judges a potential opening to depart 
from the soundly criticized guideline. Some judges simply disregarded the guideline, 
while others substituted their own alternative ratios. Clearly the Guidelines were advisory 
after Booker, but the Supreme Court also required judges to consider them. The courts 
had to address the issue of whether judges could legally disregard a particular guideline 
based on a policy disagreement with it.  The question in these cases was whether it was a 
legal error to disregard the guideline, or a legal error to consider the guideline as binding. 
A legal error would necessarily make a sentence unreasonable. 
Table 4. Positions on Crack-Cocaine Guideline 
Circuit Case Outcome 
1
st
 United States v. Pho Must Follow Ratio 
2
nd
 United States v. Castillo Must Follow Ratio 
3
rd
 United States v. Gunter Do Not Have to Follow 
4
th
 United States v. Eura Must Follow Ratio 
5
th
 United States v. Leatch Must Follow Ratio 
7
th
 United States v. Miller Must Follow Ratio 
8
th
 United States v. Johnson Must Follow Ratio 
11
th
 United States v. Williams Must Follow Ratio 
D.C. United States v. Pickett Do Not Have to Follow 
 
 Most of the courts that addressed this issue held that district judges were bound to 
follow the ratio. In United States v. Pho, the 1
st
 Circuit dealt with a district judge who 
substituted a 20-to-1 ratio for the 100-to-1 ratio. The court held that this amounted to a 
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legal error, which would therefore make the sentence unreasonable. It characterized the 
ratio as “a policy judgment, pure and simple.”
49
 The court argued that policy judgments 
were in Congress’ province, not the judiciary’s. Accordingly, “Categorical rejection of 
the 100:1 ratio impermissibly usurps Congress’s judgment about the proper sentencing 
policy for cocaine offenses.”
50
 The court also seemed concerned with the potential 
sentencing disparities that could occur if a judge was free to disregard the guideline. The 
sentences for similarly situated defendants would “depend largely on what judge happens 
to draw a particular case.”
51
 This would run against the initial thrust of the Guidelines and 
Congress’ goal to create greater uniformity in sentencing. Since the Guidelines were no 
longer binding, reasonableness review was a key mechanism to ensure uniform 
sentences. Therefore, allowing judges to deviate from the guideline would undermine this 
purpose of reasonableness review.  
 The courts that rejected this reasoning stressed that following Booker, all of the 
Guidelines were advisory. In United States v. Pickett, the D.C. Circuit noted the role of 
appellate courts in reasonableness review was to determine how well a sentence fulfils 
the relevant statutory factors set out in § 3553(a). The Guidelines were one of these 
factors, but only one. The relevant inquiry then was “how well the applicable Guideline 
effectuates the purposes of sentencing enumerated in § 3553(a).”
52
  
The D.C. Circuit had an abundance of evidence from the USSC itself that served 
as a scathing indictment of the 100-to-1 ratio’s failure to meet these purposes. The court 
noted the glaring disparities brought about by the ratio. Retail crack dealers got longer 
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sentences than their distributors, who supplied the powder cocaine from which the crack 
was made. Similarly situated offenders whose only difference was using crack-cocaine 
instead of powder-cocaine received significantly different sentences. Additionally, the 
guideline had “a disproportionate impact on African-American offenders.”
53
 The court 
noted, “The Commission thus believes that its Guideline for crack distributors generates 
sentences that are ‘greater than necessary,’ exaggerates ‘the serious of the offense” of 
crack trafficking, does not ‘promote respect for the law,’ and does not ‘provide just 
punishment of the offense.’”
54
 These were all sentencing goals spelled out in § 3553(a) 
that the crack-cocaine guideline did not meet. 
The crack-cocaine guideline’s inherent failure to meet the statutory purposes 
meant judges could not be bound to follow it. As the 3
rd
 Circuit pointed out in United 
States v. Gunter, this did not authorize district courts to categorically reject the ratio or 
substitute their own ratio as was the case in Pho. But the crack-cocaine guideline was just 
as advisory as every other guideline and it would be an error for district courts to consider 
themselves bound by it.
55
 The Supreme Court ultimately took up the issue in Kimbrough 
v. United States and agreed with these courts. Interestingly, the Court very recently issued 
a short per curium opinion holding “district courts are entitled to reject and vary 
categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with 
those Guidelines.”
56
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Theory 
 The potential explanations for judicial behavior on these issues are ideology, legal 
theories of pragmatism and legalism, judicial workload, and district court experience. 
There are theoretical reasons to expect all of these factors to have some effect on decision 
making in the context of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
Ideology 
 Ideology is perhaps the most dominant explanation of judicial behavior and 
accordingly, it makes sense to analyze it with respect to the Guidelines. Ideology is 
typically defined by whether a judge is conservative or liberal in terms of policy 
preferences. It is important to examine just how ideology might be expected to operate in 
the specific realm of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. In the general context of 
criminal law, conservative judges have typically been characterized as anti-defendant, 
while liberal judges have been characterized as pro-defendant.
57
  
There also exist strategic theories of judicial decision making, which are similar 
to ideological explanations. The key difference is that under strategic theories, judges 
worry about their relationships with other judges, higher courts and other branches of 
government. Therefore in intermediate steps, judges may not always act according to 
their policy preferences if doing so elicits a response from some other actor that is 
detrimental to the judge’s ultimate policy goal.
58
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Since both theories deal with the final goals of judges, we would expect them to 
yield the same results on these issues. Judges were afforded significant discretion and 
they would likely not have to act differently in response to other forces to achieve these 
ultimate goals. The application of this view of decision making to sentencing issues is 
clearer on some issues than others.  
 Ideological expectations are particularly unclear on the constitutionality of the 
Guidelines. Striking down the Guidelines based on the Sixth Amendment necessarily puts 
it in the context of protecting the rights of criminal defendants. Giving defendants the 
right to have facts necessary for their sentence determined by a jury would be seen as 
pro-defendant if framed this way. Additionally, if the entire framework fell, increased 
judicial discretion could result in lower sentences for defendants. This reasoning suggests 
striking down the Guidelines would benefit defendants, while upholding the Guidelines 
would work against them.  
However, the implications of striking down the Guidelines could have negative 
effects on criminal defendants. Although no appellate court actually struck down the 
Guidelines entirely, they did acknowledge the very real possibility that if the Guidelines 
were severable, the entire framework might fall leaving a judge free to choose any 
sentence within the overall statutory maximum and minimum.
59
 This would undo the 
structure that sought to ensure greater uniformity in sentencing. In this sense, striking 
down the Guidelines could be seen as working against criminal defendants, who would 
potentially be subject to more arbitrary sentences. Upholding the Guidelines could be 
seen as pro-defendant by ensuring greater uniformity in sentencing.  
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 The impact on defendants is clearer on the plain error issue. At the one end, the 
courts that adopted a presumption of prejudice made it incredibly easy for defendants to 
be resentenced. After all, the burden was on the government to rebut the presumption, 
which was not easy by any stretch. For example, the government would have to show that 
the district court completely foreclosed the possibility of a lower sentence under advisory 
guidelines, which would be a fairly odd thing to do under a mandatory framework.
60
 At 
the other end, the courts that followed the reasonable probability approach made it very 
difficult for defendants to have their sentence overturned, noting that plain error review 
was meant to be very tough.
61
 Indeed, it would be rare for defendants to have tangible 
evidence that they would have received a lower sentence under advisory guidelines as 
judges would be unlikely to opine on such an issue under mandatory guidelines.  
In the middle of these two positions is the limited remand approach. On the one 
hand, every defendant would have the opportunity for a new sentence if the district judge 
would have imposed a different sentence under advisory guidelines. But there was no 
guarantee that the district judge would rule differently, meaning some undetermined 
number of cases would be resentenced. This would have an effect on criminal defendants 
somewhere between the pro-defendant presumption of prejudice and the anti-defendant 
reasonable probability approach. Accordingly, we would expect conservative judges to 
adopt the reasonable probability approach and liberal judges to adopt a presumption of 
prejudice. More moderate judges may be more likely to advocate the limited remand.   
 The presumption of reasonableness issue can also be seen in light of the 
consequences on criminal defendants. It is importance to note the context of this issue is 
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defendants appealing their sentences in hopes of getting them overturned as 
unreasonable. Accordingly, a presumption of reasonableness would work against 
criminal defendants. The presumption was rebuttable, but the burden was on a defendant 
to do so. Furthermore, the courts admitted that it would be very difficult and uncommon 
to rebut the presumption.
62
 Defendants would not have this structural burden in courts 
that did not adopt a presumption of reasonableness. Here, reasonableness review would 
take on a more holistic nature. Courts would examine all the statutory factors as a whole, 
instead of a more guideline focused approach.
63
 As a result, defendants would have an 
easier time convincing the court that their within guideline sentence was in fact 
unreasonable. Still, despite this procedural difference, even the courts that rejected a 
presumption suggested that within guideline sentences would be very likely to be 
reasonable, meaning the practical effect may be subdued. Nevertheless, given this view 
of ideology, conservative judges would be more likely to adopt a presumption of 
reasonableness, while liberal judges would be more likely not to adopt a presumption.  
 The effects on defendants are also fairly plain on the crack-cocaine issue. Judges 
who were bound by the guideline would generally be compelled to hand out higher 
sentences based on the ratio. Additionally, the continued use of the guideline would 
perpetuate all the ills, injustices, and disparities for defendants as chronicled by the 
USSC. Judges who deviated from the ratio did so in a way that garnered more lenient 
sentences for criminal defendants. Thus, holding that judges did not have to follow the 
ratio would likely be beneficial to defendants. From this, we would expect conservative 
judges to require adherence to the guideline and liberal judges to allow rejecting it. 
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Legalism and Pragmatism 
 The prevalence of ideology in explaining judicial decision making does not 
preclude legal factors from having an effect. Much of the work relating to the lower 
courts and the law has focused on the role of precedent and the relationship between 
lower courts and higher courts.
64
 This thesis takes a broader view of the role of the law by 
looking at pragmatism and legal formalism, or legalism. These two theories of judicial 
behavior are in some degree of tension with each other. Legal formalists base their 
decisions on legal rules and methods such as the texts of statutes and constitutions, 
precedent, logical methods, rules of interpretation, and broader interpretive theories such 
as originalism.
65
 In this theory, the judge is bound by preexisting rules and merely applies 
these rules to discover the correct outcome.
66
  
Pragmatism tends to focus more on the effects of a decision than the legal rules 
governing it. Here, the judge strives to choose the best outcome in terms of the effect on 
society, regardless of legal rules. In essence, “The law is a means to an end or an 
instrument for the social good.”
67
 The pragmatist allows for a multitude of arguments and 
information from a diverse range of disciplines that would be off limits to the legalist. 
68
 
 The goals of pragmatism and legalism in their purest incarnations are certainly at 
odds with each other. However, in the reality of judicial decision making, both theories 
are blended together to some degree. Even formalists, bound by a mass of legal rules, are 
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often left with discretion over what rules to apply and how exactly to apply them.
69
 
Often, there is no clear, deductive answer of what the law requires and in these cases 
pragmatic reasoning may decide how the judge applies the rules of law and what the 
ultimate outcome is. Similarly, even ardent pragmatists would concede that they are 
bound by at least some legal rules. In many cases, these more moderate versions of the 
two theories may reach the same outcome, “But a space will be left in which a legalist 
methodology might produce substantive policies that would make many pragmatist 
judges gag.”
70
 It is important to note that there is some degree of overlap between 
pragmatism and ideology. After all, the ultimate pragmatic judgment is that of the best 
policy outcome, which will largely be dependent on a judge’s ideological policy 
preferences. 
 Despite the fusion of formalism and pragmatism in much of the sphere of judicial 
decision making, the weighty policy issues and important legal rules of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines may create an area where there are substantive differences 
between formalists and pragmatists. Indeed, many of the arguments for and against the 
constitutionality of the Guidelines were decidedly formalist or pragmatist in nature. 
Circuit courts that ruled against the Guidelines felt themselves bound by Blakely, as the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines were fundamentally indistinguishable from the state 
guidelines that the Supreme Court struck down.
71
 Here, the judges considered themselves 
bound by the precedent of a higher court, a formalist principle. But even beyond 
precedent, the underlying basis of the entire line of cases starting with Apprendi was 
based largely on the Sixth Amendment legal rule that “every defendant has the right to 
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insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts legally essential to the punishment.”
72
 
This rule was in part based on the originialist notion of “the historic link between verdict 
and judgment and the consistent limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the 
limits of the legal penalties.”
73
  
Judges also used legalist principles in defending the Guidelines. The combination 
of precedent and a legal principle underpinned one of the key arguments for upholding 
the Guidelines. Existing precedent allowed judicial factfinding under mandatory 
Guidelines. When coupled with the legal rule that only the Supreme Court could overrule 
one of its own decisions, the law seemed to compel upholding the Guidelines.
74
  
But the pragmatic reasons for upholding the Guidelines really seemed to be the 
driving force. Judges seemed to be fundamentally worried about the effects striking down 
the Guidelines would have on the entire criminal justice system. These judges admitted 
that Blakely probably meant the Guidelines were unconstitutional. But nevertheless, they 
were reluctant to strike them down due to the sweeping change and uncertainty that 
would permeate every sentencing case.
75
 Based on these arguments, pragmatists would 
be more likely to uphold the Guidelines, as the pragmatic reasons for doing so were 
stronger and more prevalent. Formalist principles were present on both sides; however, 
they seemed to dominate more in arguments for striking down the Guidelines. Therefore, 
we would expect formalists to be more likely to strike down the Guidelines. 
 In his remedial opinion, Justice Breyer stated that not every pending case 
warranted resentencing and directed appellate courts to use “ordinary prudential 
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doctrines,” namely the plain error test.
76
 Justice Breyer’s opinion provides a useful means 
for analyzing the legalist and pragmatist arguments on this issue. The reasonable 
probability outcome was likely the most legalist in nature. It conformed to Justice 
Breyer’s assertion that not every case required resentencing and was also the most 
conventional application of the plain error doctrine.  
The courts that adopted a presumption of prejudice also used precedent to justify 
their decision by noting the Supreme Court expressly allowed for a presumption of 
prejudice under certain instances.
77
 But this outcome remanded virtually every case for 
resentencing, which was inconsistent with Justice Breyer’s remedial opinion. Judges who 
adopted this outcome seemed to be concerned about the effect on criminal defendants. 
Given the nature of Booker, requiring defendants to show a reasonable probability their 
sentence would have been different would have been just too harsh on defendants.
78
 This 
focus on the effects was assuredly pragmatic in nature.  
But even more pragmatic than this was the limited remand outcome. This was 
incredibly novel and was far from “ordinary prudential doctrines.” The reasons for this 
outcome were almost exclusively pragmatic as judges stressed the efficiency and the 
certainty of the limited remand.
79
 From this, legalists would be more likely to choose the 
reasonable probability outcome. Pragmatists would be likely to adopt either the 
presumption of prejudice or the limited remand outcome. But given the almost purely 
pragmatic nature of the limited remand, stronger pragmatists would be likely to choose 
that outcome. 
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 Unlike the previous two issues, the presumption of reasonableness issue did not 
have much relevant precedent. Nevertheless, pragmatist and legalist principles seemed to 
emerge on both sides. A crucial basis for adopting a presumption of reasonableness was 
that ultimately, the Guidelines were good policy and for the vast majority of cases a 
within guideline sentence would be reasonable.
80
 These courts knew that adopting such a 
presumption would likely have the effect of generating a greater proportion of within 
guideline sentences and they seemed to feel this was a positive consequence. The courts 
that declined to adopt a presumption of reasonableness rested their decisions on more 
legalist grounds. They focused on the statutory factors governing federal sentencing and 
felt that a within guideline sentence did not guarantee that all these statutory factors were 
fulfilled.
81
 Moreover, a major concern of these judges was the legal implication of 
adopting a presumption of reasonableness. They felt this would unduly move in the 
direction of mandatory guidelines, which would undermine the legal principle that 
Booker stood for.
82
 Therefore pragmatists would be more likely to adopt a presumption of 
reasonableness than formalists. 
 The crack-cocaine issue can also be evaluated in the framework of pragmatism 
and legalism. The courts that did not require judges to follow the ratio stressed the abject 
policy failures of the guideline and its inability to meet the statutory purposes of 
sentencing. This relied on the reports of the USSC and was largely pragmatic in that it 
was making a judgment on the policy effects of the guideline.
83
 These courts also, 
however, rested their decisions on legal grounds, namely the legal principle that all of the 
                                                 
80
 Johnson, 445 F.3d at 341. 
81
 Cooper, 437 F.3d at 330. 
82
 Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 518. 
83
 Pickett, 475 F. 3d at 1354. 
 29
Guidelines were advisory.
84
 The main argument of the courts requiring judges to follow 
the ratio was in essence a legal argument about the separation of powers. These courts 
ruled that deviating from the ratio unduly supplanted Congress’ authority to define the 
proper penalty for an offense.
85
 These courts augmented this argument with pragmatic 
arguments as well by stressing the potential disparities since a sentence could vary 
greatly based on what particular judge handled the case.
86
 The prevalence of both legalist 
and pragmatist arguments on both sides makes it unclear as to which side each would 
favor. There are plausible reasons to choose either side for both legalists and pragmatists. 
 
Economic Theory 
 Economic theories of judicial behavior characterize the judge as “a rational, self-
interested utility-maximizer.”
87
 The judge has some utility function that he seeks to 
maximize. Numerous factors have been used in the judicial utility function such as 
power, income, leisure, prestige, avoiding reversal, reputation, and the intrinsic pleasure 
of judging.
88
 This thesis focuses on the leisure aspect of judicial utility. The presence of 
leisure as a source of utility suggests that judges may act in a way that simplifies and 
reduces their future workloads. A more formal explication of this is that “the judge will 
allocate his time between leisure and judging so that the last hour devoted to judging 
yields him the same utility (from judicial voting) as the last hour devoted to leisure.”
89
 
One would not expect the typical sentencing appeal to generate a whole lot of judicial 
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utility. These are generally not the blockbuster cases that affect such elements of judicial 
utility as power, prestige, and reputation.  
Thus, judges would be expected to have a general leisure preference in this area 
of law, since the utility derived from an additional hour of handling sentencing appeals 
will likely be less than the utility derived from an extra hour of leisure time. Based on the 
economic principle of diminishing marginal utility, this would be amplified for judges 
who already have higher relative workloads. Diminishing marginal utility suggests that 
the additional utility from doing something will decrease as that activity is done more and 
more. For example, a hungry person likely derives more utility from his first slice of 
pizza than say his seventh. For judges with higher workloads, more of their time is 
allocated to judging and less to leisure. Therefore, they would gain more in utility from a 
little bit of extra leisure time than a judge with a lower workload who already has more 
leisure time. To examine the economic model in the context of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines it is necessary to determine the effects of the various outcomes on future 
workload, both in terms of sheer numbers and simplicity. This can be seen in two ways: if 
judges show a general preference for outcomes that reduce their future workload and if 
this is stronger for judges with higher workloads. 
 The choice to strike down the Guidelines carried tremendous implications for the 
workloads of appellate judges as it opened an altogether new avenue for criminal 
defendants to appeal their sentences. Thus, striking down the guidelines would likely 
create a flurry of appeals. Not only would the number of appeals likely increase, the 
complexity and difficulty of those appeals would increase also. Holding Blakely to apply 
to the Guidelines answered one question, but it raised many more. Judges had the option 
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to impose a within guideline sentence, submit the facts necessary for an above guideline 
sentence to a sentencing jury, or perhaps even disregard the Guidelines entirely.
90
 Any 
way they acted would likely raise new legal questions. Sentencing juries were a novel 
institution and accordingly, the specific procedures relating to their operation would 
likely creating many new legal issues for the appellate courts to sort out.  
The “doctrinal uncertainty” led the 2
nd
 Circuit to go so far as to make the rare 
move of certifying the question of whether or not the Guidelines were constitutional to 
the Supreme Court. The court noted that if courts decided to apply Blakely, it was 
“without guidance as to the means of achieving compliance.”
91
 Choosing to uphold the 
Guidelines would avoid all of this and maintain the existing system that had been in place 
for many years. Thus, under the economic theory of judicial behavior, we would expect 
judges to uphold the Guidelines. This would be especially true of judges with already 
high workloads. 
 The choice of doctrine on the plain error issue determined how easy it was to 
dispose of these cases and the potential for future appeals. The reasonable probability 
outcome made it easy for appellate courts to handle these cases and almost foreclosed the 
potential for future appeals. Therefore in the vast majority of cases courts could simply 
affirm the sentence without much work.
92
 But perhaps the bigger impact on workload 
came from the fact that these cases (barring the incredibly rare prospect of review by the 
Supreme Court) were final, with no potential for another future appeal.  
This was different than the presumed prejudice approach. Presuming prejudice 
allowed judges to dispose of cases easily in the first instance as it had the effect of 
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remanding virtually every case.
93
 But unlike the reasonable probability outcome, after 
resentencing, these cases would very likely be appealed to the circuit courts for 
reasonableness review. This outcome created a greater future workload than the 
reasonable probability outcome.  
The effects on workload were more unclear for the limited remand outcome and 
largely depended on how likely district court judges were to impose a different sentences 
under advisory guidelines. It was simple enough to remand every case to the lower court 
to determine whether or not sentencing would have been different. If most judges decided 
the sentence would not have been different, then the appellate court would affirm the 
sentence and the effect on future workload would be similar to the reasonable probability 
outcome. However, if a significant number of judges would have imposed a different 
sentence, appellate courts would have to remand the case for resentencing and likely 
review the new sentence for reasonableness later down the road. Given the certainty of 
the effect of the reasonable probability approach on workload, the economic model 
suggests that judges would prefer this outcome. We would expect the presumption of 
prejudice outcome to be the least preferred overall. We would also expect the judges who 
do prefer it, to have lower workloads than other judges.  
 The presumption of reasonableness issue determined the ease with which 
appellate courts could dispose of appeals of within guideline sentences. Adopting a 
presumption of reasonableness made it quite easy to affirm these sentences. The onus of 
rebutting the presumption was on the defendant, and this was an admittedly difficult thing 
to do.
94
 This made it easier to dispose of a large class of cases, since following Booker, a 
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large majority of cases continued to be sentenced in accordance with the Guidelines.
95
 
Not adopting a presumption of reasonableness entailed a more exacting review of every 
case, which would likely consume more time.
96
 It was also possible for a presumption of 
reasonableness to reduce future workload, as it resulted in the affirmance of significant 
number of cases that were then very likely final. It was possible that a more rigorous 
review would yield more unreasonable sentences that would have to be remanded and 
then likely appealed again to the circuit court. Therefore, we would expect judges to 
adopt a presumption of reasonableness.  
 Requiring judges to adhere to the crack-cocaine ratio made dealing with appeals 
fairly straightforward. If judges did conform to the ratio, there was no legal error and 
given the presumptive reasonableness of the Guidelines, the sentence would likely be 
affirmed. If appellate courts allowed judges to deviate from the ratio based on policy 
differences, they had a more demanding inquiry. Different judges could make different 
substitutions and alterations to the guideline, which would result in a diverse and 
challenging set of factors for appellate courts to evaluate. The effect on future workload 
depended on how many district judges felt bound by the guideline. If this proportion was 
high, then allowing policy disagreements would result in more cases being remanded. 
However, if not many judges felt bounded by the guideline, then requiring them to follow 
it would result in more cases being remanded. The effects on future workload are unclear, 
but the difference in the easiness of actually dealing with appeals suggests that judges 
would prefer requiring district court judges to follow the Guideline. 
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District Court Experience 
There is no specific theoretical basis to expect district court experience to have an 
impact on judicial decision making in this area. Instead, the mere structure of federal 
sentencing suggests that it may be relevant. District court judges are responsible for 
imposing the actual sentence. It is possible that having this experience may give appellate 
judges a different set of motivations and concerns in deciding issues relating to the 
Guidelines.  
Some district judges have expressed their opposition to the Guidelines because 
they unduly constrain their discretion in sentencing. For example, Judge Nancy Gertner 
of the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts felt the Guidelines’ focus on criminal history 
and the nature of the offense was too narrow and did not allow for other considerations 
that she felt were essential to determining a sentence.
97
 Judges with district court 
experience who agree with Gertner would be likely to rule in a way that made the 
guidelines as advisory as possible.  
It would make sense for these judges to strike down the Guidelines as they would 
have less formal constraints from departing from them. On the plain error issue, the 
presumption of prejudice outcome was the one that likely weakened the Guidelines most. 
Since virtually every sentence was remanded, district courts would be forced to 
resentence under advisory guidelines. Procedurally this would be more aligned with what 
these judges think and substantively it had the greater potential for departures from the 
Guidelines. A presumption of reasonableness clearly strengthened the hold of the 
Guidelines, and therefore these judges would oppose it. Similarly, allowing district court 
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judges to disagree with the crack-cocaine guideline afforded them significantly more 
discretion. 
Table 5. Predicted Outcomes Based on Independent Variables 
Explanation Issue 
 Const. of 
Guidelines 
Plain Error Presumption of 
Reasonableness 
Crack-Cocaine 
Ideology     
   Liberal Unclear Presumption of 
Prejudice 
No 
Presumption 
Do Not Have to 
Follow 
   Conservative Unclear Reasonable 
Probability 
 
Presumption 
 
Must Follow 
Leg./Prag.     
   Legalist Unconstitutional Reasonable 
Probability 
No 
Presumption 
Unclear 
   Pragmatist Constitutional Limited 
Remand 
 
Presumption 
Unclear 
Economic Constitutional Reasonable 
Probability 
 
Presumption 
Must Follow 
District Court 
Experience 
Unconstitutional Presumption of 
Prejudice 
No 
Presumption 
Do Not Have to 
Follow 
 
Methodology 
 This thesis identifies and codes the positions of appellate court judges on four 
issues: the constitutionality of the guidelines, plain error, presumption of reasonableness, 
and the crack-cocaine guideline. It examines ideology, workload, whether a judge is a 
legalist or pragmatist, and district court experience as potential explanatory variables. 
Logistical regression analysis was then run with the position of appellate judge as the 
dependent variable and the aforementioned independent variables. For relationships that 
approached or achieved statistical significance, probability estimates were run. These 
estimates show the likelihood that a judge would choose an outcome if he had a certain 
value of the relevant independent variable. Careful analysis of the opinions in these cases 
augmented the statistical methods used. 
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 Case selection was limited to cases that directly and thoroughly reasoned through 
these issues. Courts of appeals commonly established their position in one or two cases, 
and then merely applied it to subsequent cases. For example, the 2
nd
 Circuit adopted and 
justified the limited remand approach in United States v. Crosby and in subsequent cases 
would simply “remand in accordance with United States v. Crosby…”
98
 These cases 
became known as “Crosby remands.”
99
 This was true across the other circuits as well. 
This thesis does not look at these subsequent cases as often, they had little substantive 
reasoning. Regardless of their initial views, judges would generally fall in line with 
whatever approach the court adopted. Including these cases would not aid in examining 
judicial behavior and would likely dilute the findings.  
Admittedly, there is some subjectivity in choosing cases and it is possible that the 
cases selected are not exhaustive. But every case selected thoroughly sets forth the 
reasons for adopting a particular outcome. An invaluable resource in identifying these 
cases was Ohio State law professor Douglas A. Berman’s Sentencing Law and Policy 
blog. Professor Berman does an amazingly thorough job chronicling the developments in 
sentencing law and accordingly, his analysis of cases was incredibly useful in finding 
appropriate cases. Additionally, for the presumption of reasonableness and crack-cocaine 
issues, the Supreme Court noted the relevant circuit splits and provided citations for cases 
that addressed the issues.
100
 
 These cases were read carefully to determine each judge’s position on the issue. 
The majority opinion and any concurrences or dissents were analyzed and an outcome 
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was attributed to each. The judge who wrote a given opinion and any judges who joined 
it were attributed the corresponding outcome. The outcomes were based strictly on 
doctrine and not the ultimate choice of whether resentencing was warranted. A judge who 
agreed with the majority on doctrine could still dissent if he felt their application of it was 
wrong. Similarly, a judge who agreed whether or not a case should be resentenced could 
disagree completely over the reason why.  Once these positions were attributed, they 
were assigned a numerical value to make them suitable for statistical analysis. No rank 
was implied in the number. 
 Ideology was measured by the judge’s common space score, a more sophisticated 
alternative to merely using the appointing president’s party. The judicial common space 
score is built on scores for elected officials, namely presidents, senators, and 
representatives. These scores are based on votes in both chambers of Congress and 
explicit presidential intentions. The judge is assigned the score of a particular elected 
official based on various scenarios. For example, if the judge’s home state has a senator 
who is the same party as the president, the judge is assigned the senator’s score. If both 
senators from the home state are the same party as the president, the average of the two 
scores is used. Finally, if neither home state senator is the same party as the appointing 
president, his score is used. This method of assigning ideological scores to judges 
accounts for the idea of senatorial courtesy, that is sometimes present in lower court 
appointments. Often for these vacancies, presidents will consult with home state senators 
of the same party and ensure they approve of the nominee.
101
 Therefore, it is suitable to 
use the senators’ scores in these instances.  
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Common space scores range from -1 to 1 with a negative score meaning a judge is 
liberal.
102
 The quantitative nature of the common space score is an advantage over merely 
using the political party of the appointing president to measure ideology. The categorical 
labels Republican and Democrat do not capture any gradations among liberals and among 
conservatives. A very conservative or liberal judge is treated the same as a moderate 
conservative or liberal judge. The common space score allows for sharper measurement 
of ideology and puts all judges on a uniform scale.  
 There are no conventional measures of pragmatism and legalism. Most judges are 
reluctant to attribute such labels to themselves and it would be difficult to accurately 
glean such leanings from opinions for this many judges. This thesis uses the absolute 
value of the common space score as a proxy for whether a judge is more pragmatist or 
legalist. The absolute value of the common space score is properly understood as a 
measure of ideological extremism. A higher value, meaning greater ideological 
extremism represents legalists. A lower score, meaning more ideological moderation, 
represents pragmatists. Admittedly, ideological extremism is not a perfect measure of 
pragmatism and legalism. Still, it does provide some useful means of quantitatively 
measuring a difficult to measure variable.  
There is anecdotal evidence that it may be an appropriate measure to use. There 
are some prominent federal judges who have voiced their pragmatist or formalist 
tendencies. It is instructive to look at their common space scores. Judge Richard Posner 
explicitly describes himself as a pragmatist, and is one of the ardent voices for 
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pragmatism.
103
 Posner’s common space score is a very moderate 0.014. Posner describes 
his colleague on the 7
th
 Circuit, Judge Frank Easterbrook, as a legalist. Indeed, this 
appears to be accurate given Easterbrook’s scholarly work. For example, he has written, 
“That decision by rule is a benefit cannot be doubted.”
104
 Easterbrook’s common space 
score is 0.581, one of the most conservative and one of the highest absolute values. The 
pragmatist Posner has a very small absolute value, while the legalist Easterbrook has a 
very large absolute value. Of course these are just two judges out of many more. But 
these two judges suggest that there is some basis for using ideological extremism as a 
measure for legalism and pragmatism. 
The measure used for judicial workload was the number of terminations on the 
merits by circuit per judge for the year 2007.
105
 This was the most recent data when the 
analysis was done. This measure was different for each circuit. Therefore judges on the 
same circuit were all attributed the same value. The number of terminations on the merits 
is a broad measure that is proper for capturing how hard judges are working. Given the 
economic theory of judicial behavior, which contemplates the overall time spent judging, 
it is appropriate to use this more encompassing measure than a narrower one such as 
criminal appeals or sentencing appeals. 
 To determine whether a judge had district court experience, biographical data 
from the Federal Judicial Center was used.
106
 To utilize this information for statistical 
analysis, a numerical value was given to each judge based on district court experience. 
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Table 6. Measures of Independent Variables 
Variable Measure 
Ideology Common Space Score 
Pragmatism/Legalism Absolute Value of Common Space Score 
Workload Terminations on the merits per judge for 2007, by circuit 
District Court Experience Biographical data from Federal Judicial Center 
 
 Logistical regression analysis was run for each issue with the judge’s position as 
the dependent variable and the independent variables as measured above. Multinomial 
logistical analysis was used on the plain error issue since it had three potential outcomes. 
This became standard logit analysis for the other issues with only two outcomes. For 
statistically significant relationships and nearly statistically significant relationships, 
probability estimates were run. Statistical significance was measured at the 95% level for 
a two-tailed test corresponding to a z-score of 1.96 in absolute value terms. There is, of 
course, a degree of subjectivity in choosing to run probability estimates for relationships 
that were not quite statistically significant. There was no specific cutoff, but the lowest z-
score in absolute value terms for which probability estimates were run was 1.60.  
 These probability estimates show the likelihood of a judge supporting an outcome 
if he was to have a certain value of the relevant independent variable. For ordinal 
variables, such as the common space score, the absolute value of the common space 
score, and workload, the values used in the probability estimates were one standard 
deviation above and below the mean value of the relevant variable. For district court 
experience, a nominal variable, simply the maximum and minimum values, which 
correspond to either having district court experience or not, were used. All other variables 
were held constant at their means for probability estimates of a specific variable. It is 
possible that the probability estimates for variables that were close, but not quite 
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statistically significant are not very reliable. The 95% confidence interval for these 
estimates has been included. If there is a fair degree of overlap in probabilities for a given 
value of a variable, the estimates may not be very useful. 
 
Results 
 
Constitutionality of the Guidelines 
 For the constitutionality of the Guidelines issue, the only independent variables 
that reached or came close to statistical significance were ideology and workload. 
Ideology achieved statistical significance at the 95% level, while workload fell a little 
short. The probability estimates for these two variables illustrate their effects on decision 
making. 
Table 7. Regression Results for Constitutionality of Guidelines 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Score P > |z| 95% Confidence Int. 
District Ct. -.0140649    .9895021     -0.01    0.989     -1.953453    1.925324 
Ideology -3.577291    1.360165     -2.63    0.009     -6.243165    -.9114163 
Leg./Prag. -2.522111    3.820908     -0.66    0.509     -10.01095    4.966731 
Workload -.0046802    .0028835     -1.62    0.105     -.0103317    .0009713 
Constant 2.488971    2.123612     1.17    0.241     -1.673232    6.651174 
 
Table 8. Probability Estimates for Ideology 
 Liberal Conservative 
Outcome Mean 95% Confidence Interval Mean  95% Confidence Interval 
Constitutional .43 .18-.70 .90 .69-.99 
Unconstitutional .57 .30-.82 .10 .01-.31 
 
As Table 8 shows, ideology appears to have a significant effect on the behavior of 
conservative judges. They have a very high probability of upholding the Guidelines and a 
very low probability of striking them down. This suggests that conservatives see the 
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Guidelines as anti-defendant. Therefore, affording defendants the additional right to jury 
determination of some sentencing facts and the potential for lower sentences under non-
binding guidelines seem to be the relevant policy issues for conservative judges.  
Ideology does not strongly distinguish liberal judges, who are split far more 
evenly. There is a large degree of overlap in the probabilities for each outcome 
suggesting that a liberal judge could plausibly go either way. This may represent the 
uncertainty of the effects on criminal defendants. Liberals may have different perceptions 
over which outcome will benefit defendants more. This does not mean that ideology is 
completely inert. If there is some general force, for example workload, that is pushing 
judges to overwhelmingly uphold the Guidelines, the fact that a significant majority of 
liberal judges defy that trend may mean that ideology is motivating them in a significant 
way. 
Table 9. Probability Estimates for Workload 
 Low Workload High Workload 
Outcome Mean 95% Confidence Interval Mean  95% Confidence Interval 
Constitutional .61 .33-.83 .85 .60-.97 
Unconstitutional .39 .17-.67 .15 .03-.40 
 
 The probability estimates for workload in Table 9 seem to be somewhat consistent 
with the economic theory of judicial behavior. There seems to be a general preference for 
upholding the Guidelines. This is certainly true of judges with high workloads, who are 
very likely to uphold them. There is a fair amount of overlap for the probabilities of 
judges with low workloads, but there is enough difference to suggest that they might 
slightly be more likely to uphold the Guidelines. Striking down the Guidelines would 
likely increase future workload and lead to more complex cases. It therefore makes sense 
that judges overall would prefer to uphold the Guidelines. Furthermore, it makes sense 
 43
that judges with higher workloads would have an even higher probability of upholding 
the Guidelines. Since more of their time is already devoted to judging, they would gain 
more utility from added leisure time. 
Table 10. Probability Estimates for Ideology with High Workload 
 Liberal Conservative 
Outcome Mean 95% Confidence Interval Mean  95% Confidence Interval 
Constitutional .59 .23-.89 .94 .77-1.00 
Unconstitutional .41 .11-.77 .06 .00-.23 
 
Table 11. Probability Estimates for Ideology with Low Workload 
 Liberal Conservative 
Outcome Mean 95% Confidence Interval Mean  95% Confidence Interval 
Constitutional .27 .09-.55 .82 .51-.97 
Unconstitutional .73 .45-.91 .18 .03-.49 
 
One way to disentangle the effects of ideology and workload is to look at 
probability estimates for ideology with a high workload and ideology with a low 
workload as shown in Tables 10 and 11. From this, we can see that conservative judges 
strongly uphold the Guidelines irrespective of workload. This confirms the view that 
ideology is their main motivation on this issue. This is not the case for liberal judges, for 
whom workload seems to have a very significant effect. Liberal judges with low 
workloads tend to significantly favor striking down the Guidelines. But this is hardly the 
case for liberal judges with high workloads, who favor upholding the Guidelines. 
Workload has such an effect that judges of the same ideology reverse their preferences 
given different workloads. This suggests that whatever explanatory power ideology may 
have for liberal judges, it is secondary to workload.  
 It is also important to discuss the variables that statistically, did not have a strong 
effect on judicial behavior. The implications from not having an effect are also interesting 
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and may shed light on the nature of judicial behavior in this area. Quantitatively, whether 
a judge was a legalist or a pragmatist did not have much of an effect. But the opinions in 
these cases were filled with pragmatist and legalist arguments, suggesting they are not 
totally irrelevant. It is possible that pragmatist and legalist arguments correlate strongly 
with ideology. If judges of one ideology overwhelmingly adopt legalist arguments while 
judges of the other ideology overwhelmingly adopt pragmatist arguments, the absolute 
value of the common score would not capture pragmatism and legalism properly. To be 
sure, it is possible that under this scenario, that pragmatist and legalist arguments are 
merely justifications for policy preferences. Furthermore, the fact that judicial workload 
seems to have some explanatory power may support the notion that pragmatism has                                                 
influence in decision making. Many of the pragmatist arguments dealt with the 
consequences striking down the Guidelines would have on the functioning of courts. 
These same consequences would be relevant in the economic model of judicial behavior.   
 Past experience as a district court judge does not explain a whole lot. This would 
suggest that perhaps ideology and concerns over workload are overriding any factors 
specific to judges with district court experience. It may be case that judges with district 
court experience do harbor opposition to the Guidelines but concerns over workload in 
their current job are more pressing than those sentiments. 
 
Plain Error 
 Since there were three potential outcomes on the plain error issue, multiple 
regressions had to be run to be able to compare all of the outcomes to each other. The 
base outcome was rotated and the other outcomes were compared to it. For the first two 
 45
sets of regression results, reasonable probability is the base outcome and the other two 
outcomes are being compared to it. The third set compares the presumption of prejudice 
outcome and the limited remand outcome. The results show that ideology appears to have 
a significant effect on choosing between the limited remand and reasonable probability 
outcomes. The only other variable to show anything near a statistically significant 
relationship was workload, when the reasonable probability and limited remand outcomes 
were compared. Probability estimates were run for these two variables. 
Table 12. Regression Results for Plain Error 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Score P > |z| 95% Confidence Int. 
Reasonable Probability and Presumption of Prejudice 
District Ct. .873143 .596277      1.46 0.143     -.2955384    2.041824 
Ideology -.8022534    .7734549     -1.04    0.300     -2.318197    .7136904 
Leg./Prag. -1.472839    1.853469     -0.79    0.427      -5.10557     2.159893 
Workload -.0021097     .001737     -1.21    0.225     -.0055141    .0012947 
Constant 1.145725    .9686018     1.18    0.237     -.7526997    3.044149 
Reasonable Probability and Limited Remand 
District Ct. .7631935 .7187727 1.06    0.288     -.6455751    2.171962 
Ideology -2.139284    .8845503     -2.42    0.016     -3.872971    -.4055976 
Leg./Prag. -.2576204    2.184696     -0.12    0.906     -4.539545    4.024304 
Workload -.0037899    .0023637     -1.60    0.109     -.0084227    .0008428 
Constant .9418034 1.260718     0.75    0.455     -1.529159    3.412765 
Presumption of Prejudice and Limited Remand 
District Ct. -.1099495     .673177     -0.16    0.870     -1.429352    1.209453 
Ideology -1.337031    .8638543     -1.55    0.122     -3.030154    .3560924 
Leg./Prag. 1.215218    2.066795     0.59    0.557     -2.835626    5.266062 
Workload -.0016803    .0023781     -0.71    0.480     -.0063413    .0029808 
Constant -.2039215    1.228802     -0.17    0.868      -2.61233     2.204487 
 
Table 13. Probability Estimates for Ideology 
 Liberal Conservative 
Outcome Mean 95% Confidence Interval Mean  95% Confidence Interval 
Reasonable Probability .25 .13-.44 .51 .34-.69 
Presumption of Prejudice 
Limited Remand 
.37 
.37 
.21-.55 
.22-.56 
.37 
.12 
.21-.54 
.04-.26 
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 The probability estimates for ideology in Table 13 do not explain a whole lot for 
liberal judges. They may slightly prefer the limited remand and presumption of prejudice 
outcomes, but not by a whole lot. Still, these are the two outcomes that are most pro-
defendant. The estimates for conservative judges suggest that he most likely outcome for 
them is reasonable probability, which is consistent with what we would expect. But these 
judges are almost as likely to adopt a presumption of prejudice, which is the most pro-
defendant outcome. These estimates suggest that liberal and conservative judges slightly 
favor the outcomes we would expect them to. But the fact that they also favor the 
opposite outcome by nearly as much suggests that ideology is not the main concern on 
this issue. 
Table 14. Probability Estimates for Workload 
 Low Workload High Workload 
Outcome Mean 95% Confidence Interval Mean  95% Confidence Interval 
Reasonable Probability .27 .14-.45 .43 .31-.55 
Presumption of Prejudice 
Limited Remand 
.40 
.32 
.23-.60 
.15-.53 
.38 
.19 
.27-.51 
.10-.32 
 
 In Table 14, the probability estimates for workload suggest that the presumption 
of prejudice outcome is the most likely for judges with low workloads and the reasonable 
probability outcome is the most likely for judges with high workload. This is consistent 
with our expectation that judges with higher workloads will be more likely to adopt an 
outcome that reduces their workloads. But still, these probabilities are not that much 
greater than the other outcomes. Judge with high workloads do favor the reasonable 
probability and presumption of prejudice outcomes more than the limited remand. This 
suggests that they preferred the ease with which they could deal with cases in those two 
methods, by either remanding or affirming virtually all cases. It is true under a 
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presumption of prejudice they would likely have to hear these cases again on appeal. But 
perhaps these judges expected most of them to be within guideline sentences anyway, 
meaning they could affirm them fairly easily. That judges with low workloads are more 
likely to adopt outcomes with higher future workloads is consistent with the economic 
theory of judicial behavior. 
 Pragmatism and legalism do not seem to seem to explain much statistically. It 
may be the case that the absolute value of the common space score is not the best 
measure of pragmatism or legalism. It may be the case that pragmatism correlates with 
ideology in such a way that liberal judges tend to be more pragmatic and conservative 
judges more formalistic. The probability estimates for ideology tend to support this. 
Liberal judges are fairly more likely to adopt the limited remand, surely the most 
pragmatic outcome, than conservative judges. The fact that the limited remand 
probability is very near the presumption of prejudice probability, the most liberal, 
suggests that at least some liberal judges are sacrificing ideological concerns for 
pragmatic ones. These probability estimates also support the notion that conservatism 
may correlate with legalism, since conservatives were much more likely to choose the 
two outcomes that were most grounded in the law.  
 District court experience once again does not seem to have much of an effect. 
This is interesting since the effects on district courts were quite different for the various 
outcomes. The presumption of prejudice and limited remand approaches guaranteed 
many remands to the district courts. Meanwhile, the reasonable probability approach 
resulted in very few. It is likely that for judges with district court experience, these effects 
were secondary to the effects on their own workloads. Of all the issues, the plain error 
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issue was the one that dealt the least with the fundamental question of how advisory the 
Guidelines would be. This may be why district court experience was not particularly 
relevant here. In a sense, the issue had an expiration date once all the cases in the Booker 
pipeline were dealt with. Therefore, the future implications for the role of the Guidelines 
were diminished.  
 
Presumption of Prejudice 
 District court experience was the only independent variable to show a statistically 
significant relationship on the presumption of reasonableness issue. This is interesting 
since it does not really show up in any other issue. 
Table 15. Regression Results for Presumption of Reasonableness 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Score P > |z| 95% Confidence Int. 
District Ct. 2.210209    .9371343     2.36    0.018      .3734593     4.046958 
Ideology -1.267974    1.197107     -1.06    0.290      -3.61426 1.078312 
Leg./Prag. -2.636397    2.403243     -1.10    0.273     -7.346667 2.073873 
Workload -.0017188    .0017777     -0.97    0.334      -.005203     .0017654 
Constant -.0338156    1.262858     -0.03    0.979     -2.508972    2.441341 
 
Table 16. Probability Estimates for District Court Experience 
 Experience No Experience 
Outcome Mean 95% Confidence Interval Mean  95% Confidence Interval 
Presumption .46 .22-.70 .87 .67-.96 
No Presumption .54 .30-.78 .13 .04-.32 
 
The probability estimates in Table 16 suggest that having district court experience 
makes judges much more likely not to adopt a presumption of reasonableness. Judges 
without this experience are very likely to adopt a presumption of reasonableness. Having 
district court experience reduces this likelihood dramatically, to the point where a judge 
could reasonably go either way, or possibly be even slightly more likely to not adopt a 
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presumption. This would seem to be consistent with district court judge antipathy toward 
the Guidelines. Adopting a presumption of reasonableness would clearly entrench the 
Guidelines and provide an incentive for district court judges to impose sentences in 
accordance with them. Judges with district court experience would be more likely to 
loosen the pull of the Guidelines, which on this issue would be not adopting a 
presumption of reasonableness. The question remains why district court experience has 
an effect only on this issue. The constitutionality of the Guidelines would seem to be the 
issue most relevant to district court discretion. It is possible the appellate workload 
concerns were more striking on that issue. Perhaps judges felt the effect on appellate 
workload would not be as large on this issue. 
 None of the other independent variables showed a meaningful relationship on the 
presumption of reasonableness issue. One potential explanation for this is that a strong 
majority of judges voted to adopt a presumption of reasonableness. Given this majority, 
there was not as much variation for these variables to explain. 
Table 17. Voting Patterns of Judges on Presumption of Reasonableness 
Outcome Percent of Judges Number of Judges 
Presumption 29% 12 
No Presumption 71% 30 
 
The strong preference for adopting a presumption of reasonableness as shown in 
Table 17 does lend some support for notion that judges act in a way that reduces and 
simplifies their future workload. Adopting a presumption of reasonableness certainly 
would have this effect, and judges show a strong preference for adopting it. Of course, 
there could be other reasons for this preference, but its presence does support one 
principle of the economic theory of judicial behavior. The lack of a statistically 
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significant relationship for judicial workload suggests there is little difference between 
judges with higher workloads and judges with lower workloads. So, it would not 
necessarily be the case that judges with higher workloads are more likely to adopt a 
presumption of reasonableness. But nevertheless, the overall partiality for a presumption 
of reasonableness is consistent with an economic view of judicial decision making.  
Ideology does not seem to matter much here. Once again, this could be because 
there is a strong overall proclivity for a presumption of reasonableness that is irrespective 
of ideology. If concerns over workload are driving this penchant, then we can infer that 
these concerns trump any ideological concerns. A potential reason for this is that even 
courts that did not adopt a presumption of reasonableness suggested that a within 
guideline sentence would still be very likely to be reasonable despite a more exacting 
review. This suggests that it was possible that not adopting a presumption of 
reasonableness was functionally not as beneficial to defendants as it might appear to be. 
With these ideological effects diminished, other forces such as workload concerns could 
take precedence. 
There does not appear to be an appreciable difference between legalists and 
pragmatists on this issue. This is not to completely discount the role of the law for judges 
who chose not to adopt a presumption of reasonableness. Many of them admitted the 
effect of adopting a presumption, namely the strong likelihood of affirming within 
guideline sentences, would be the same effect of not adopting a presumption. Yet they 
still chose an outcome that would require more work of them. These judges would seem 
to be strongly affected by the law as they chose an outcome that requires more work to 
get the same result for reasons that are legal in nature. Legalism is then relevant for this 
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small class of judges. But it seems more judges were swayed by other forces. It may be 
the case that pragmatic arguments, such as the fact that adopting a presumption would 
make it very easy to affirm within guideline sentences, served as the impetus for most 
judges to conform to the economic theory of judicial behavior and simplify their future 
workload. 
Crack-Cocaine 
None of the variables even approached statistical significance on the crack-
cocaine issue. This is possibly due to a relatively small sample size and does not 
necessarily mean that all of these variables are irrelevant. It is still worthwhile to look at 
how judges voted on this issue and when coupled with careful analysis of the opinions, 
this can provide insight into judicial behavior on this issue. 
Table 18 Regression Results for Crack Cocaine 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Score P > |z| 95% Confidence Int. 
District Ct. -33.06305    2.49e+07     -0.00    1.000     -4.87e+07    4.87e+07 
Ideology -2.548962    1.867648     -1.36    0.172     -6.209485     1.11156 
Leg./Prag. 8.479764     7.01195      1.21    0.227     -5.263406    22.22293 
Workload -.0044021    .0039338     -1.12    0.263     -.0121122    .0033081 
Constant -1.975493    3.655248     -0.54    0.589     -9.139647    5.188661 
 
Table 19. Voting Patterns of Judges on Crack-Cocaine 
Outcome Percent of Judges Number of Judges 
Do not have to follow 27% 7 
Must follow 73% 19 
 
 As shown in Table 19, there is a strong majority of judges who require adherence 
to the crack-cocaine ratio. This would suggest that if the economic model was correct, 
that judges felt requiring district judges to follow the ratio would reduce and simplify 
their future workloads. Appellate judges would not likely know how many district court 
judges felt bound by the guideline and how many did not. Accordingly, it would be 
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difficult for them to determine which outcome would result in more unreasonable 
sentences that would come back to the appellate court. Since these considerations are 
likely unclear, the key point seems to be the nature of review appellate judges would have 
to carryout in each circumstance. Requiring judges to follow the ratio allowed for a 
relatively easy review on appeal, especially when coupled with a presumption of 
reasonableness for within guideline sentences. Allowing judges to depart from it, 
however, would require a more taxing review and would require appellate judges to deal 
with many potential substitute ratios, varying justifications, and potential sentencing 
disparities. Taken together, these considerations are consistent with the economic model 
of judicial behavior. Furthermore, despite not showing a significant statistical 
relationship, it is instructive to look at the workloads of courts that did not require 
obedience to the ratio compared to courts that did. 
Table 20. Crack-Cocaine Outcomes Ordered by Workload  
Circuit Outcome Workload 
D.C. Do Not Have to Follow 148 
7
th
 Must Follow Ratio 346 
1
st
 Must Follow Ratio 406 
8
th
 Must Follow Ratio 415 
3
rd
 Do Not Have to Follow 423 
2
nd
 Must Follow Ratio 485 
11
th
 Must Follow Ratio 705 
4
th
 Must Follow Ratio 706 
5
th
 Must Follow Ratio 876 
 
We can see in Table 20 that the court with the lowest overall workload, by a fairly 
large margin, chose not to require district judges to follow the ratio. The other court that 
did this had a workload that was clumped together in a group that was somewhat lumped 
in the middle. Meanwhile, the three courts with significantly higher workloads than any 
other courts, the 4
th
, 5
th
, and 11
th
 circuits, required district court judges to follow the ratio. 
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Obviously, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions from these results, but they do lend 
some support to principle that judges with higher workloads will be more likely to choose 
outcomes that reduce their work than judges with lower workloads.  
 One of the more interesting variables not to show a meaningful relationship on 
this issue in particular is ideology. The crack-cocaine issue is perhaps the most 
ideologically charged issue of all of these. The disparity in sentences between crack-
cocaine and powder-cocaine offenders has spurred much political debate. This has only 
been amplified by the racial disparities present in the issue. For example, numerous 
candidates in the third Democratic presidential primary debate for the 2008 election 
addressed the disparity between crack-cocaine and powder-cocaine sentences.
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 The 
effects on defendants are very obvious on this issue, and it is interesting that ideology 
does not explain the behavior of judges very well. The fact that workload concerns seem 
to have a stronger basis than ideology is a fairly telling sign that even on an ideologically 
charged issue, that workload appears to take precedence. 
 It is also perhaps interesting that district court experience is not statistically 
significant on this issue. Under advisory guidelines, requiring judges to follow the ratio is 
a rare formal constraint on the discretion of district court judges. Accordingly, if former 
district court judges now on the circuit courts share Judge Gertner’s view, we would 
expect them to allow district court judges to depart from the guideline. The sorts of 
concerns over the utility of the Guidelines expressed by Judge Gertner would be 
particularly relevant to the crack-cocaine guideline as even the USSC acknowledged its 
failure to fulfill many of the goals of sentencing. Of course, workload concerns directly 
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affect these judges now, while concerns over district court discretion may only be 
secondary. 
 Finally, legalism and pragmatism do not seem to explain much on the crack-
cocaine issue. This is possibly because there were legitimate pragmatist and legalist 
arguments on both sides. Those requiring adherence to the guideline had the legalist 
separation of powers argument and the pragmatic arguments about disparities and 
appellate review. Similarly, those who allowed district court judges to deviate from the 
guideline had the legalist point that all of the guidelines were advisory along with 
pragmatist concerns over the negative consequences of the guideline. It is possible that 
legalist and pragmatist arguments alone could not reach a sufficient conclusion, opening 
the door for judges to minimize their workload. 
 
Conclusions 
 When we look at the effects of these explanations across all of the issues, we are 
able to draw some broader conclusions about the role each of them in relation to judicial 
behavior on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 
 Ideology is certainly the most dominant explanation of judicial behavior. Indeed, 
it does strongly explain the behavior of conservative judges on the constitutionality of the 
Guidelines issue. But really, that is about it. It does not serve as the main force acting on 
liberals for the same issue and it only slightly distinguishes conservatives and liberals on 
the plain error issue. It did not even show a statistically significant relationship on the 
other issues. This is significant. Given the broad explanatory power of ideology, it is 
remarkable to find an area of such consequence where it does not explain much. 
 55
 But if not ideology, then what? The explanation that seems to hold the best across 
the issues is the economic theory of judicial behavior. Judges tend to show a general 
preference for outcomes that reduce their future workloads. Furthermore, judges with 
higher workloads tend to favor these outcomes more than judges with lower workloads. 
This is consistent with a conception of judicial utility where judges maximize their 
leisure time in order to maximize their utility. Additionally, the fact that judges with 
higher workloads are even more likely to favor outcomes that minimize their workload is 
consistent with the notion that these judges have more utility to gain from additional 
leisure time than judges with lower workloads. 
 Even though workload holds up as the best explanation on these issues, it is 
undeniable that pragmatist and legalist arguments pervade the opinions in these cases. 
Yet, on none of the issues did this explain anything statistically. It may be the case that 
ideological extremism does not properly capture whether a judge is a legalist or a 
pragmatist for enough judges. It may be the case that pragmatism correlates more with 
ideology, meaning liberals tend to be pragmatists and conservatives tend to be formalists. 
There is some evidence that this is the case on the plain error issue. This of course could 
mean legalism and pragmatism are merely guises for ideological concerns, but they 
appear to still have some independent power. We see this on the presumption of 
reasonableness issue, where for legal reasons, judges adopt a more laborious outcome 
despite no appreciable difference in consequences. Furthermore, the fact that workload 
explains so much may be vindication of pragmatism. After all, pragmatic concerns and 
concerns over workload are closely related. 
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 Finally, district court experience only seems to explain the presumption of 
reasonableness issue. Indeed, its effect on judges on this issue is fairly strong. But the fact 
that it shows up in no other issue suggests that if it is a factor in decision making, it is a 
secondary factor. On most issues, appellate judges seem to be more concerned with their 
current jobs than the jobs they once held. 
 The implications of these results for criminal defendants and the future of federal 
sentencing policy are significant. The thrust of future policy in this area will likely be 
toward simplicity and ease, irrespective of ideological concerns. Some may see this 
cynically, that judges want to work as little as possible. But there are legitimate benefits 
to having an efficient criminal justice system. For criminal defendants, casting their legal 
arguments in these terms is likely the best way to win over judges. 
